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BRONSON CUTTING VS. DENNIS CHAVEZ:
BATTLE OF THE PATRONES IN NEW MEXICO, 1934

WILLIAM H. PICKENS

FOR

in its history, New Mexico has a clean cut
political issue, the welfare of the people on one side, and every selfish interest on the other." Bronson Murray' Cutting paused and
smoothed back the hair which had matted on his forehead in the
sultry Albuquerque Armory. The crowd generously applauded and
again the senior senator's voice filled the October night:
THE FIRST TIME

The Democratic party in New Mexico has adopted a policy that was
and is excoriated by the democratic president of the United States.
That shows you the futility of the two party system. That shows you
there are only two positions that an individual or a party can take.
You are either for or against the laboring man, the farmer, the small
citizens, the welfare of those who cannot take care of themselves.!

Since the year was 1934, the place Depression America, and those
who could not help themselves probably a majority of U.S. citizens, Cutting's listeners understood and approved his words.
By November 2, with the long campaign near its end, Congressman Dennis Chavez, the opponent of Bronson Cutting, was likewise adamant:
The legislation I shall sponsor and strive to get enacted, if I am
elected to the U.S. Senate, shall be the legislation the majority of the
citizens want sponsored and enacted. I shall never assume the attitude
that I know what is best for the people, and that I am so much wiser
than they are that my opinion is unquestionable and the only correct
one. I shall never strive to be or pose as a political dictator in any
sense of the word. 2
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These quotations indicate the contrast between Bronson Cutting
and Dennis Chavez during one of the most crucial campaigns in
New Mexico's history. The voters were forced to choose between
the two most Fowerful public figures which the parties could
offer. Since the early nineteen twenties, however, Cutting and
Chavez had been strangers in virtually every trait of character and
breeding except for their similar political aspirations. The succeeding decade was to twist their lives into strange shapes. In a drama
reminiscent of Thornton Wilder's bridge at San Luis Rey these
two men were to meet over the finest prize in New Mexico politics: a seat in the United States Senate.
It is strange that such a remarkable moment in our state's history
has not generated more profound explanations. The several interpretations which have appeared tend toward uniformity. None of
them explain both the larger aspects of the campaign and the compelling personalities of the candidates. I should like to raise a few
questions in an attempt to clarify the data which scholars have
gathered over the years.
First, what sort of man was Bronson Cutting: a consistent charlatan or a humane Progressive? Was he an astute opportunist "vho
cunningly mobilized poor Spanish-speaking farmers, wealthy oilmen, and fraternal veterans, or did his patrician character bridge
the gaps honestly and openly? Cutting's personality has been widely explored,3 but his political philosophy has too often been left
untouched by students of this era. Second, although Dennis
Chavez in 1934 was hardly as complicated a man as Cutting, in a
limited way, shaped by his ethnic background, he was just as eccentric. For instance, why did Chavez risk his political future in a
clash with the invincible senior senator when he probably could
have defeated interim Senator Carl Hatch in the primary and
easily won a seat across the aisle from Cutting? Is the only answer,
as postulated by several studies, that he desired to replace Cutting
as New Mexico's patr6n?4 Finally, the New Deal must be mentioned. It was years after Bronson Cutting's death before reasonable speculation appeared concerning Roosevelt's reason for endorsing the more conservative Chavez who had supported John
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Nance Garner for the Democratic nomination in 1932.5 This article seeks to portray the drama of the collision between these two
unique personalities, and to illuminate the larger outlines of the
New Deal in New Mexico and ways that depression was shaping
political consciousness. After sketching the political lives of Cutting and Chavez- I 934 was merely the termination of a long
process-I shall offer some tentative answers ,to the questions posed
above.
1. . BRONSON CUTTING IN NEW MEXICO

CUTTING was a transplant from high society on Long Island, a
graduate of Groton and Harvard. Suffering from tuberculosis, he
came to New Mexico on a stretcher in 1910. Here this flamboyant
personality regained his health enough to become state secretary for
Roosevelt's Bull Moosers two years later. Cutting's career for the
next twenty years, during which he successively wore the label
Progressive, Democrat, and Republican, mirrored his character: he
was erratic, confident, aggressive, yet he always maintained a polished compassion which endeared him in ways similar to those of
his Harvard classmate, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Gutting was
often unpredictable, except when aroused in the political arena.
His many enemies could always testify to the awesome if unorthodox force he martialed against them. Had it not been for his great
wealth and his ownership of the Santa Fe New Mexican, Cutting
undoubtedly would have been ignored in serious political circles.
The number of his biographers indicates that the man and his successes were singular, and that his career was even more vivid bee
cause his style was not indigenous to political New Mexico. 6
For the beginnings of Cutting's political strength we must return to his quarrel with Democratic Governor Arthur T. Hannett
in 1925. There was a long tradition in the state that· public men
needed some special focus for their attention between elections so
that in even Novembers they could form coalitions representing a
broad spectrum of accomplishments. As a concerned citizen, Bronson Cutting seized upon the idea of a labor commissioner and a
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veterans' bureau as justifiable services of government. Hannett,
who was determined to do a constructive if conservative job for
New Mexico, dismissed the proposals as extravagant and aimed
solely at mobilizing votes. 7 Hannett argued that the state was too
poor for such projects and, indeed, the cost of all state and local
services during the next fiscal year was a modest sixteen million
dollars. 8
Perhaps more crucial to the rejection 'of Cutting's proposals
was the pervasive philosophy among officials that the primary
responsibility of the social authority was the gentle guidance and
protection of citizens, especially from one another. Government in
agricultural New Mexico had always performed the tasks that
were unprofitable or entirely unsuited to private enterprise, but
needed for orderly administration. The forte of these politicans was
rhetoric, not public action. Both parties firmly believed that fundamental changes should come from the private sector and only afterwards be seconded by governmental action. Organized labor was
painfully weak in New Mexico, and conservative Republicans,
along with many Democrats, did not feel that state government
had the resources or the mandate to change that condition. They
also insisted that veterans' affairs were Federal business and that
parallel operations would be wasteful. This was, of course, exactly
the pattern which was to develop in almost every agency during
the New DeaJ.9
As a result of this rebuke, Bronson Cutting threw his financial
support to Hannett's Republican opponent in 1926, and was rewarded by appointment to the vacant seat of the late Senator A. A.
Jones in 1927. While critical questions about his reliability plagued
party stalwarts back home, he hurried to Washington. Reports filtered back, however, that Cutting appeared orthodox:
The administration forces did not know how to place him. Last
week I [J. M. Hervey] made the acquaintance of several influential
Republicans in the House and Senate and they all said that they
were very much disappointed that you [Governor Richard Dillon]
did not send a dependable Republican up here. . . .
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However, the first test came yesterday and. he voted on two occasions with the straight Republican ticket. lo

Cutting's political me~tor, Governor Dillon, made the same points
in the' 1 928 campaign: "Senator Cutting is safeguarding our tariff
interests in the Senate. . . . He has fearlessly championed . . .
the protective tariff, conservancy . . . [and] public land restored
to state ownership. Ill! The neophyte had clearly adopted the tenets
of New Mexico Republicanism during its finest hours-or had he
forgotten the expansion of government which he had advocated
earlier?

THE REPUBLICANS were swept into office in the 1928 campaign,
winning every statewide race by margins that threatened to wreck
the political balance since statehood. Even the GOP leaders were
stunned. The Albuquerque Journal wondered whether the Democrats were in permanent eclipse. 12 Burdened with Governor Al
Smith of New York, a wet Catholic, as their candidate for President, the Democrats lost even their traditional support in the
eastern, Baptist counties of New Mexico. From the statewide
perspective the essential point was that the Republicans had forged
the most powerful coalition in New Mexico's history, with Bronson Cutting, Charles Springer, and Richard Dillon each contributing a significant bloc of votes. Spanish-speaking farmers and their
brothers in the barrios had voted solidly along with sheepmen and
wealthy commercial interests for Republican prosperity. Even organized labor went GOP.13 An analysis of the components of this
grand coalition will indicate the possibilities which Bronson Cutting saw for permanent Republican strength.
Impoverished Spanish Americans 14 lived all along the Rio
Grande and its tributaries. The tradition of dividing land among
all surviving sons had splintered their agricultural production into
miniscule units: in 1930 about 10,000 of the 31,4°4 farms had
less than fifty acres and most were in central New Mexico. 15 "Accelerated soil erosion"1 6 and lack of formal training in the tech-
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niques of intensive cultivation guaranteed that they would remain
subsistence farmers while at the same time, their relatives in the
towns
battle[d] their own cultural inadequacy. . . . They [had] no tradition of competition, of education, or of Western Civilization beyond
the Sixteenth Century,17

These New Mexicans were analogous in some ways to the immigrants who had swarmed into America since the 1890'S. They had
deep cultural traditions which they wished to maintain-Spanishbut rejected their immediate heritage from Mexico. Their language
was often considered inferior, perhaps because it did not well express Anglo-American values of commercialism and individualism.
Their religion was stringent and sensuously pagan to many of their
non-Catholic neighbors. These Spanish-speaking people were both
"sensitive and proud,"18 while many of them occupied a servant
status and a makeshift, manipulated citizenship. Either overtly or
subtly, these people were constantly accused of inferiority, and
they reacted much the same as did new Americans in the industrial
centers of the east who were likewise organized into massive political blocs. Clustering under the patron for jobs and political advice, Spanish Americans in the Rio Grande Valley also looked for
some protection against the strange, new Anglo ways which intruded on every side. 19
There were differences, however, between the new wave of immigrants which swept onto America's eastern shores after 1890 and
these Spanish-speaking New Mexicans. Unfortunately, the discrepancies made the latter less amenable to political change. First
of all, they were hardly newcomers. Often their families extended
far back into the colonial past, and most held some piece of land
which had formerly been part of an extensive grant fragmented
through equal inheritance, sale, or outright fraud. Secondly, until
1940 Spanish surnames were in the numerical majority in New
Mexico. Slowly, and most painfully, they saw their domination
dwindling awalo and this kindled a fierce reactionary streak and
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an insistence on biculturalism which was not as evident among
eastern immigrants. A terrible paradox haunted these citizens: they
revered a past and a heritage which had little relevance to the
euphoria of the American Twenties or to the desperation of the
Thirties. At the same time, they shared the dream of material
abundance which permeated our nation during these years. In effect, these Spanish Americans were locked in a position neither in
nor out of American society. Although they neither wished nor
were compelled to abandon their indigenous heritage, they sought
the new advantages which, rightly or wrongly, were incompatible
with that heritage. They were segregated but unorganized. In
order to secure their votes, both Dennis Chavez and Bronson Cutting had to find some kind of solution to this dilemma.
These frustrated Spanish Americans adored Bronson Cutting.
Consistently, he employed their brothers, fought for theircandidates, and conversed in their tongue. 21 Cutting first protected their
interests in 1926 when he opposed Governor Hannett's election reforms which would have prohibited straight party tickets and assistance within the voting booth. Such provisions were common in
other states, but Cutting argued that the high proportion of Spanish-speaking illiterates in New Mexico meant that they would be
disfranchised by such a scheme. In spite of such moralistic hindsight as that of vVarren Beck, who asserted that attacks on the
Election Code were "bigoted, sordid, and irresponsible,"22 there is
much evidence that many New Mexicans would have been prevented from voting. 23 At any rate, this was the prevailing opinion,
and villagers along the Rio Grande loved the handsome Anglo
from Harvard who seemed honestly interested in protecting them
not only from such diabolical desires as they believed Hannett harbored but also from the Spanish patrones who had exploited them
for centuries. But more than this, as he traveled extensively in their
midst, the wealthy Cutting became a symbol of afHuent and comfortable America, while his aesthetic love of their heritage convinced them that such duality was not anachronistic. Further, Cutting's distaste for men of his own political standing (mostly shrewd
Anglos) increased his fondness for the unaffected life of the leath-
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er-faced farmer whose Hispanic hospitality and fiery fiestas
charmed the patrician. Furthermore, these people took Bronson
Cutting very seriously while many leaders of his own community
laughed at everything except his money. For his own part, Cutting
understood that Spanish Americans could love him more than a
man from their mNn ethnic background since he combined the
divergent motivations in their hearts. In addition, he did not compete with them: his political rise would not implicitly demean
them as the ascendancy of a leader from their own ranks might. In
1934 Dennis Chavez was certain that his people would support
their own, but he failed to reckon with these powerful undercurrents.
Another crucial segment of the voting population was the workers. Although only 4,476 persons were officially categorized as
wage earners in 1929,24 their families and the expanding towns
promised to make them a potent new factor in the balance of power. Their impact was felt in the eastern counties, especially where
oil had been discovered in 1924. By 1930 New Mexico had become one of the leading oil states,25 and the oil fields were the
most important reason for the six counties' climb from 12.4 per
cent of the state's total vote in 1926 to 17 per cent in 1934. 26 It
was also becoming apparent that the lower-middle-class mercantile
interests which provided a foundation for the struggling towns had
a common stake with many laborers, certainly with those who extracted natural resources. The Depression served to drive both
groups closer together as Cutting's speeches in 1934 indicate.
These, then, were the political possibilities which absorbed the
Senator from New Mexico. How Cutting protected and promoted
the interests of these divergent groups has been neglected by historians-possibly because Cutting's erratic practice of politics is
much more engaging. Likewise, most accounts only contain the
violent reactions which he elicited: "'[Hannett's] political ruin
was due to Bronson Cutting, a political Frankenstein who turned
upon anyone he could not dominate, Republican or Democrat
alike.' "27 Such remarks have led even sympathetic biographers to
emphasize unduly Cutting's irascibility, his inconsistency, or his

PICKENS: CUTTING VS. CHAVEZ

13

luck. It is time that these colorful reviews of his antics be restored
to their proper perspective by due attention to the Senator's numerous attempts to weld together the two most substantial groups in
political New Mexico. 28

ONLY ONCE during the Twenties was Cutting able to convince his
Republican allies that such a coalition should be established
through legislative action. On January 23, 1929, the Speaker of
the New Mexico House of Representatives and two other legislators introduced a strong proposal for a labor commissioner with
the power "to require the performance of any act that is necessary
for protection of life, health, and safety of employees."29 The story
of the ensuing explosion within the Republican Party has been
well documented. In brief, the srtuggle became one between U.S.
Senator Bronson Cutting who led the "governmental expansionists" and Charles Springer who controlled the "Old Guard."
Springer distrusted any artificial coalition between Republicans
and working men. Rumors of high-powered politics were rampant.
Newspapers devoted most of their space to debates on the Bill and
editorials on the debaters. In the heat of the controversy, the Republican Majority Leader in the Senate resigned, "stating as his
reason that he could not vote for the. Republican [platform] pledge
of establishing a Labor Commission."30 The legislature was deadlocked for six weeks and no agreement was reached on any major
law until the fifty-eighth day of the sixty-day session. On March
8, the last day, the Labor Commissioner Bill came before the Senate for final consideration after the lower chamber had narrowly
passed it. The drama of that particular debate was incredibly. intense. Almost every political figure in the state was present, including Cutting who missed President-elect Hoover's inauguration
for this moment. Defeat came for the Bill after hours of pounding
applause, emotive speeches, jeers, and violence on the Senate Hoor,
but no one really won. The bedraggled opponents of the proposed
labor commission stood afterwards jabbering among themselves.
Perhaps they realized that their own sun was setting. As Charles
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Judah said, "the Republican Party in New Mexico was butchered
.
by its own leaders."31
One of the most misunderstood parts of Cutting's career is his
role in this fight. The usual explanation is that he merely sought
control of the Republican Party and seized this as a likely issue.
Andrea A. Parker's recent analysis continues this interpretation:
Cutting decided upon the Labor Commissioner as the test of strength.
. . . The formation of an office of State Labor Commissioner had
been the excuse used by Cutting to break relations with the Republican Party.32

Such a view insists that the Old Guard cared little about the substance of the Bill since it was probably unenforceable, but that
they wanted Cutting dispatched to Washington and his links to
the legislative party severed. Adherents of this interpretation insist that the Depression caused further loss of faith in the GOP
and that Roosevelt's largess cemented the poor of New Mexico
into Democratic ranks. They also view Cutting's assistance to the
Democrats as undermining every effort to reunite his adopted Republican Party. Such conclusions make several errors.
First, this group argues that success spoiled the 1928 Republicans so. that they fell to criticizing one another rather than the
Democrats. In addition to assuming that GOP leaders were a good
deal less shrewd than they were, this perspective does not account
for much legislative history in New Mexico. Republicans had exercised similar control before statehood but had not disagreed so
violently. After 19 I 2, they controlled the legislature twice, just as
solidly as in 1929, yet such breaches hadnot occurred. 33 Defeat for
the Labor Commissioner Bill stemmed from the fact that strong
and bipartisan forces were always aligned against any new proposal
which might tighten the finances of the state or cause reorganization of the system. Republicans were justifiably suspicious that
their support of the laboring man might lose them the votes of
wealthy New Mexicans.
The second error of proponents of the "Cutting schism" is their
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insistence that neither side was truly concerned with the Labor
Bill reforms, that it was merely a convenient issue for domination
of the Party. They contend that the issue was political and not eco~
nomic. This ignores the fact that several other controversial measures were presented to the legislature. Among these were additional free textbook legislation, an appropriations bill opposed by
the powerful Taxpayers Association, a sweeping Workmen's Compensation Act, a new securities bill, a measure enlarging the State
Highway Department's powers, and proposals for uniform banking laws. 34 Any or all of these issues were better adapted for victories over conservatives, if that had been the sole goal of Cutting
progressives, since none of these proposals dealt with extensive institutional additions or seeming "class" legislation.
Bronson Cutting was dumbfounded by the consistent Republican vote of the poor Spanish-American counties. He realized that
Republicans such as Charles Springer, Solomon Luna, Charles
Spiess, and Thomas B. Catron had effectively adapted the economic patron system to politics and that they believed peon loyalty
to the interests of wealthy landowners both natural and eternal.
Cutting insisted that conservatism could not continue to attract
votes from the underprivileged majority in New Mexico and that
increasing afHuence would soon weaken their subservience. 35 He
believed that only a solid coalition between Rio Grande agricultural counties and the growing vote of labor in the eastern oil fields
could maintain Republicans in power. Other progressives contended that this political front led by Cutting's wealth and his
power of the press would be invincible. To them, the Labor Commissioner Bill was the first step toward convincing Anglo workers
of the political possibilities of cooperation with the Spanish-American lower class. How else can the solid Spanish-speaking vote in
the legislature for this Bill-an Act which had little relevance to
their agricultural constitutents-be explained?36 All Republicans
had welcomed the coalition which brought the stunning victory of
1928, but only the followers of Bronson Cutting were willing to
abandon the old Republican fixtures in order to continue'it.
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II. DENNIS CHAVEZ: UP FROM SO. ARNO

WHEN Cutting first adopted this state, he lived in a different world
from a thin young rodman who worked for the Albuquerque City
Engineer. Dionicio Chavez had been born into one of the oldest
families in New Mexico. His desperate father, like so many others
who had found little gold in the Gilded Age, moved to the barrio
of Barelas in 1895 when Dennis was seven. Forced to leave school
after the seventh grade, young Dennis worked in a dingy grocery
store on South Arno in Albuquerque. 37 While Cutting was purchasing newspapers and promoting splinter parties, Dennis Chavez
was learning the backroom, tough-minded politics which were
characteristic of men with few resources other than their wits. In
succession, Chavez was defeated for county clerk, appointed state
Game Warden, edited a Belen newspaper, and attended Georgetown Law School while serving as assistant to the Executive Clerk
of the U.S. Senate. He struggled long hours to overcome the twin
handicaps of a limited education and the barriers erected against
any aspiring Spanish American, particularly those imposed by his
own people. As a result, the contrast with Cutting was striking.
Dennis Chavez was rather stern and suspicious in a way common
to self-made men. He scratched in the cloakrooms for political opportunities, yet revered the formal rules of politics and government
since these had provided his path to success. Political power as exercised by patrones such as E. A. Miera and Thomas B. Catron,
who tallied alike the votes of their sheep and the dear departed
with those of residents,38 had impressed the young Chavez, and he
frankly determined to emulate them, adapting his own style to
more sophisticated times. With dreams and doubts, he rose carefully in politics during New Mexico's Twenties.
By the summer of 1930, New Mexicans had sensed the widening circles of America's economic disturbances. Based as it was on
the exploitation of natural resources, the local economy had never
been abundant but had been self-supporting and somewhat stable.
The Republican defeat in November 1930 did not reRect outright
panic but was brought about by the party's disunity and general
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uneasiness about national prosperity. Aided by his influential
brother, David, in northern counties, Dennis Chavez shared in the
Democrats' good fortune. At a convention which marked the rising
strength of Bernalillo County, Clyde Tingley switched the v9tes
that gained Chavez a second-ballot nomination for New Mexico's
lone seat in the House of Representatives. Such an honor was a
debt which the party paid for long service. Chavez was known as a
stalwart even in the midst of party faithfuls and was proud of his
regularity:
For twenty-two years I have faithfully and loyally supported all democratic nominees from the senators, congressmen, governors down to
the county surveyors. At no time has the party found me wanting
when it called. . . . I was ahvays willing to do my utmost for the
nominee.
Will I get the nomination? I will if the democrats are desirous of
getting an additional congressman; if faithfulness, loyalty, and service
are to be rewarded. 39

The campaign of Chavez against Republican Albert Simms was
energetic, orthodox, and successful. He trotted out traditional
Democratic criticisms of the tariff as " 'the instrument of the few
rather than of the many,' "40 and chastised Republicans for ignoring the needs of his fellow Hispanos. Because of his past support
for organized labor and veterans' benefits, Chavez was able to add
these groups to his ethnic voters and defeat Simms by 18,000 out
of I I 7,8 I 3 votes cast. 41 The old Barons of politics who had run
New Mexico since statehood had not exactly elected a man from
their midst, but Dennis Chavez was one who followed their lead
and was safe in their eyes.
In order to describe Chavez as a congressman, it is necessary to
understand the system of political thought which produced him.
As a territory, New Mexico had been strongly Republican because
the national administration had been dominated by that party since
the Civil War. A small group of wealthy aristocrats slowly emerged
and carefully wielded the political power delegated to them by
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the United States. Leaders such as Albert Bacon Fall, Charles
Spiess, Holm Bursum, Nathan Jaffa, Miguel Otero, George Curry,
and Harvey Fergusson were spread over the state, and although
they often came into conflict, they held a high respect for one another. They had written the state's constitution. They strongly influenced every important public official in the Twenties. So firmly
established that nothing could threaten their social position, the
political Barons served in most respects as the upper class of New
Mexico. In addition to picking candidates for office when they
personally declined to serve, many of these men insisted on limited
government in New Mexico which would reflect their interests in
the community, both state and national.
Because New Mexico had very limited tax resources under such
an arrangement, campaign issues were not particularly important
for the first two decades after statehood. Much more decisive were
the candidate's personality, the party organization, and especially
the men who supported him. Politics required a kind of toughness
characteristic of the mercantile world but mellowed by a sense of
the need for compromise within the knot of professional politicians.
True skill was shown (and victory insured) not on the speaker's
platform, but rather behind hotel doors where the racial and financial cleavages in New Mexico were squarely confronted. The precarious political balance saw the two parties split evenly for the
governorship from 1912 through 1930, while Democrats did well
in Congressional races but consistently lost in their bids for the
legislature. 42 Intense fear of internecine destruction hung over the
parties and made it difficult for any man to establish himself as a
potent political force in his own right. 43 Therefore, party loyalty
such as that proclaimed by Dennis Chavez became a cardinal
virtue.
All these forces made for superficial campaigns. "I am for the
constitution in its entirety. I love it all." "The will of the people as
a whole must be carried OUt."44 These were characteristic remarks
by Chavez during the campaign of I 930. Such statements indicated that he held the opinion of the Barons about public authority.
Not only did the young congressman learn this from the patricians
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under whom he had served as political apprentice, but he himself
realized that any increase in the burden of government in New
Mexico would crack the citizens financially and destroy any man
politically. So, theory, tradition, and practicality merged nicely for
Dennis Chavez as the Thirties opened. For him and most other
politicians, state government served its constituents by protecting
their property and employing about a thousand of those who had
served in the successful campaign. Chavez naturally carried many
of these views to the national capital. During the period of New
Mexico's extreme political immaturity, neither the problems nor
the stakes were great, and a timeless conflict of high-powered rhetoric and low-temperature bargaining prevailed. Dennis Chavez
became a master at both.
It is clear from the extensive analysis in Edward Lahart's work
on the tenure of Chavez as a congressman that practical values
guided his decisions. Although simplistic about problems such as
foreign affairs and the tariff, Chavez was knowledgeable and thorough in his duty to his people. He insured that the levels of relief
for Rio Grande farmers would not be diminished. 45 He also insisted on larger benefits for New Mexico's many veterans, and announced strong opposition to a regressive Federal sales tax which
would have crippled his underprivileged state. 46 Such services for
the state's narrow interests were always expected of a freshman
congressman, but Dennis Chavez displayed unmatched intensity.
Such an attitude did little -to enhance his stature in the House of
Representatives, but his stunning victory over Jose Armijo in 1932
(94,764 to 52,9°5) even topped Roosevelt's huge majority in the
state. During the next term, Chavez demonstrated the same zeal
for New Mexico's interest with little concern for national problems. In addition after Senator Sam G. Bratton's resignation in
May 1933 and the death of Democratic Governor Seligman in
September, Chavez became more openly involved in state politics. 47
By November 1933 he had become the fourth New Mexican since
statehood to serve on the powerful Democratic National Committee, which had influence over patronage. 48 By 1934, Dennis
Chavez had risen to the top of the State Democratic Party, but prac-
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tical and shrewd as ever, he realized that the enigmatic Bronson
Cutting still held sway over the popular imagination. All the contri.butions from Federal coffers which Chave~ could muster could
not match the electrifying appeal of New Mexico's lone national
hero, or so it seemed to many. After years of struggle and prepara c
tion on both sides, the dramatic battle of the patrones would shake
politics in New Mexico as it has not been shaken since.

III. THE MONUMENTAL CAMPAIGN, 1934

CUTTING'S MANEUVERS for re-election began in 1932. Franklin
Roosevelt was still clinging to conservative economics-"at Pittsburgh in October [1932] he condemned the Hoover administration for failing to balance the Federal budget, describing Hoover's
spending as 'most reckless and extravagant.' "49 Yet Bronson Cutting, already an advocate of enormous expansion of the Federal
government, was urging deficit spending to meet the crisis. When
Dennis Chavez argued for a twenty-five per cent cut in Federal
expenses, Cutting countered that:
The resources of this country are well nigh inexhaustible. There is
no real danger to the maintenance of our public credit. What we do
need is an immediate expansion of employment on a colossal scale by
the Federal Government. fiO

At a time when the New Deal did not really have shape in FDR's
thinking, Cutting was predicting that" 'public works will not solve
unemployment but they will start things going by increasing buying power among the masses.' "51 In the Congressional Record of
the seventy-eighth Congress, Bronson Cutting favored public ownership of utilities and nationalization of banks. 52 Later, he cited the
failure to nationalize the banks during the crisis of March 1933 as
"President Roosevelt's great mistake."53 Such economic heresy was
compounded by the Senator's repudiation of every article in the
traditional Republican faith: He was wet, strongly favored recog-
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nition of Russia, and held the tariff in contempt. 54 As the Hundred
Days began in 1933, with FDR urg~ng cutbacks in Federal spending, Cutting risked their long friendship by opposing such tactics
as the slash of veterans' benefits. In short, Senator Cutting, who
had rarely been equivocal,on any major issue, became convinced
early in the Depression that the Federal government was the only
instrument powerful enough to energize the economy and bring
acclaim to men of progressive vision.
As 1934 dawned, it indeed appeared that Bronson Cutting
would be the overwhelming choice for United States Senator. He
had abandoned the official structure of the sinking Republican
Party in 1932. By his support of maverick groups such as El Cluh
Politico lndependiente, a vital front for bolting Republicans, he
had profited from the Democratic victory.55 For this, the Old
Guard despised him more than ever. Holm Bursum, J. M. Hervey,
Ed Safford, and Lem White-once leading names in the Republican Party-held a conference in the summer of 1934 with the
exclusive purpose of crucifying Cutting. 56 The Simms family,
upper class New Mexicans who had matried into the Mark Hanna
dynasty, likewise set out to stop this rabid Republican. Cutting
only laughed.
Indeed, these attacks seemed to strengthen his popularity, because the Baron system of politics had lost its authority in the
deepening economic' crisis. Thirty per cent of New Mexicans were
on relief. 57 Few of them listened any longer to the platitudes
which had promised progress and prosperity during the halcyon
Twenties. Middle-ranking Republicans scrambled to support the
one man with a positive anti-depression program-the only one
among them with a solid chance for victory. In an unusual Bash
of insight, the New Mexico State Trihune outlined the factors
necessary for any Cutting-Republican reconciliation:
Mr. Cutting . . . has ahNays been too smart to be cornered. He holds
a balance of power and knows how to use it. He is a master politician.
. . . For years old line politicians sniffed at his political ability. After
about the fourth defeat they began to reconsider. Mr. Cutting has the
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gift of calculating rashness. . . . The Republican Party will come to
Cutting because it has decided that such is the way to win.
Mr. Cutting is . . . the unregenerate rebel who appreciated the
net returns of. rebellion. Senator Cutting wins political combats because he combines high intelligence with measured courage. He
knows when to threaten and when to retreat,58

The Republicans did come to Cutting, and on his terms. First,
he insisted that the party take a more liberal stance than the straggling Democrats. One writer maintains that the 1934 GOP platform had by far the broadest understanding of social responsibilities, of welfare provisions, and of concerns voiced by workers. 59
This opinion is substantiated by the enthusiastic support given Cutting by labor unions, which had always supported Chavez in the
past. 60 Fleta Springer in the New Republic dismissed Chavez as a
reactionary and revealed the underground desire of conservatives to
"get Cutting in 1934 and defeat Roosevelt in 1936."61 Lower-income groups applauded Cutting's firm stand against the Democrats'
state sales tax which Chavez had been forced to endorse. On the
other end of the spectrum, Cutting shrewdly lured the president
of the New Mexico Petroleum Association into his ranks. 62
In short, the Senator had succeeded in establishing the coalition
of Spanish Americans and dispossessed Anglos around the state's
periphery. When the air cleared in New Mexico, this lone Republican was elected in 1934, the only man in his party to win statewide office until 1950.

IV. OUTCOME OF THE BATTLE

ON THE WHOLE, the election was a disappointment to state Democrats. Like so many others, the campaign bogged down into threats
and rebuttals, charges of disloyalty, and allegations that public officials had over-profited. 63 There was much traditional rhetoric
tailored to the economic crisis, but Democrats expected that the
same forces that swept them to victory in 1932 would do so again.
This was not to be the case: Carl Hatch led the state ticket with an
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unimpressive fifty-five per cent major~ty over a weak Republican
opponent. Several other Democrats barely outdistanced their
counterparts. 64
There were reasons for such weakness. Although Roosevelt was
popular, he was unable to campaign for anyone within the state.
Certainly the New Deal programs were not as well coordinated nor
as massive as they would be in 1936. Democratic Governors Seligman and Hockenhull had inspired no one, and their policies were
warmed over from the Twenties. In my opinion, the chief source
of Republican strength was Bronson Cutting's insight. Through
his prowess, the state GOP had stolen many issues and much
thunder from Democrats. As at Yorktown, the band played "The
World Turned Upside Down."
Speaking from the reportorial standpoint only [said the Albuquerque
Tribune] we do not recall a New Mexico campaign more scrambled
as to issues and causes than the current one. Just now we have the
republican party running on a Roosevelt platform. The democratic
party, though Rooseveltian, is attracting anti-Cutting republicans.
The republican national committeeman denounced the republican
ticket. . . . Devoted Cutting supporters are ignoring candidate Dillon for the Senate. Democrats here and there are espousing the cause
of Senator Cutting.
Only the election will unscramble this egg. 65

The egg was certainly unscrambled in the Cutting-Chavez race,
and it hatched the next generation's ideas about political strength
in New Mexico.
An analysis of key counties, as set forth on the following page,66
shows that Cutting's strategy was sound, even though he defeated
Chavez by only 2,284 votes out of 152,172. It is essential to remember that Dennis Chavez was the strongest Democratic candidate in New Mexico's history and that his campaign was superb.
Nevertheless, several trends should be noted. Chavez and the
Democrats were increasingly taking the Spanish-speaking vote
away away from Republicans even when a candidate with a Spanish surname ran against Chavez in 1932. Cutting completely re-
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EIGHT NEW MEXICO COUNTIES WITH OVER 70% SPANISH-SPEAKING
POPULATION

County
Mora
Rio Arriba
Taos
Guadalupe
Sandoval
Valencia
San Miguel
Socorro
TOTALS

1930
Simms Chavez

1932
Armijo Chavez

1934
Cutting Chavez

1879
3032
1830
1223
1302
2751
4808
1693

2066
3552
2618
1790
1424
2067
3809
1916

1527
2032
2981
1616
1541
3151
5767
1890

2873
5148
3183
1839
1837
2344
4610
2539

2209
4042
3233
1986
2087
3224
6852
3046

2330
4449
3774
1643
1768
2142
4006
2479

18,518

19,242

20,505

24,328

26,679

21,591

THREE NEW MEXICO COUNTIES WITH MOST MINING LABOR VOTE

County
Santa Fe
Colfax
McKinley
TOTALS

1930
Simms Chavez
3974
2910
1683

3607
3330
1576

--

--

8567

8513

1932,
Armijo Chavez
3636
3120
1237

--

7933

5710
4367
2202

--

12,279

1934
Cutting Chavez
5040
3796
1782

--

10,618

4988
3575
1744

--

10,307

SIX COUNTIES ON THE EAST SIDE WHICH WERE TRADITIONALLY
DEMOCRATIC
County

1930
Simms Chavez

1932
Armijo Chavez

1934
Cutting Chavez

Eddy
Chaves
Roosevelt
Curry
Quay
Lea

637
1782
334
691
994
227

1836
2641
1433
2141
1931
1186

715
1581
446
768
806
245

3593
4402
2831
3661
2911
2317

1233
2618
971
1632
2028
694

2658
2866
1919
3139
2027
1652

TOTALS

4665

11,168

4651

19,715

9176

14,261

BERNALILLO COUNTY
1930
Simms Chavez
5947

8317

1932
Armijo Chavez
5875

12,203

1934
Cutting Chavez
9182

9454
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versed that trend. It is also clear that labor votes in the mining
districts had been solidly Democratic in 1932. There Cutting was
able to force a draw: Only the large vote on the east side saved
Chavez from worse defeat, and even then Senator Cutti~g attracted five thousand votes more than the 193 2 R~publican total.
The crucial Bernalillo county vote which had gone overwhelmingly for Chavez as congressman was likewise split in 1934 as mercantile interests and Spanish Americans were torn between Roosevelt's
New Deal and Cutting's philosophy.
Bronson Cutting had electrified the Republican Party in New
Mexico. Speculation that Cutting would be the Republican nominee to oppose the giant Roosevelt in 1936 immediately intensified. 67 He was absolute dictator of his disheveled party in the
state and was clearly the only man with vision enough to challenge
the New Deal there. Bronson Murray Cutting, however, had enjoyed his last victory. Six months later he died in a foggy field near
Kirkland, Missouri, in an eerie plane disaster. 68 With him the new
Republican Coalition in New Mexico passed. The 1936 election
crushed whatever life Cutting had breathed into his adopted party.
No state Democrat won by less than 20,000 votes. Cutting's "Forgotten New Mexican" had voted Democratic, and it would be along, long time before he changed.

V. CONCLUSIONS

to determine whether Bronson Cutting was a charlatan, we
must put aside his personal idiosyncrasies and concentrate on his
political philosophy and his view of government's proper functions.
Regardless of party label, Cutting had insisted since the nineteen
twenties that public authority should be an active participant in the
processes of social change. Government had to have powers to
strike directly at evils produced by an industrial society. In many
of these attitudes he was similar to progressives of earlier periods,
but Cutting had no illusions about return to a SImpler America, or
the effectiveness of negative public action such as trust busting.
FIRST,
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Rather, he advocated positive programs of welfare to aid the underprivileged and to give them weapons to fight for a larger share of
the American Dream against guardians of the more ample portion.
Only a strong paternalistic government with a thrust for economic
equality could achieve these ends. Cutting's friends were bound
to him by personal loans and favors, and he could understand the
powerful appeal of men who offered a system of direct aid to destitute New Mexicans. He further understood that government
services were coming to mean much more to the people than either
free enterprise rhetoric or minimal patronage by state or Federal
governments.
Obviously such a philosophy appealed more and more during
the Great Depression. Cutting was in tune "vith the times. As a
spokesman for massive government he was recognized in a way that
Bob LaFollette, George Norris, and Hiram Johnson never were. 69
In addition, the Senator from New Mexico demonstrated, admittedly on a small scale, that rural and urban interests could be
welded together into an electoral bloc based on a single philosophy
of government, an achievement rarely realized by progressives in
the past.
Secondly, we must confront the question, why did Dennis
Chavez challenge the only man in New Mexico who could possibly have defeated him? The traditional answer maintains that
Chavez was jealous of Cutting's leadership among Spanish-speaking New Mexicans. It is difficult to swallow this assertion for several reasons. Chavez could have assaulted Cutting's hold over the
Rio Grande counties just as effectively if he had been elected as the
senior Senator's counterpart. Defeat of incumbent Senator Carl
Hatch in the primary could have done that for Chavez. Bronson
Cutting was at the height of his popularity, especially in the counties which Chavez had to win, and the Congressman, with his sensitive system of political feelers, surely realized this. Dennis Chavez
won elections because he was a superb tactician and a careful
organizer. He was, after all, a patient and persistent man; after the
election he doggedly pursued Cutting's seat all the way to the Senate Elections. Committee. 70 Such a man would not have been
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blinded by ethnic jealousy to the extent of unneccessarily risking
his entire political future.
Recently it has been said that Chavez and his fellow Democrats
underestimated Cutting's strength in the aura of the New Deal.
This supposition has merit but needs amplification. No Democrat
in New Mexico (with the possible exception of Albuquerque's
Clyde Tingley) accurately perceived the political changes which
began around 1930. Certainly men like Chavez understood that
their party was strengthened by the fact that Republicans had been
caught in the maelstrom, but the only conclusion to be drawn from
studies of their thinking in 1934 is that they did not realize the direction the political current was taking. Chavez had little conception of Cutting's coalition strategy. He analyzed the situation in
terms of the old Baron rules for victory. Had he not gone far
enough when he sought out popular issues and balanced political
forces?71 Had he not placed his supporters in key positions with
control over patronage? Had he not carefully measured out phrases
perfected through long years of political practice? Everything in
the past of Dennis Chavez pointed to victory. Moreover, he continued to believe the national administration could. defeat any
Republican.
But this time Chavez' instincts failed. Political influence no
longer rested exclusively upon patronage in the traditional sense
but also upon the all-embracing system of relief and work projects
which· Cutting supported. Individual favors from Congressman
Chavez could not compare to the lightning collective action in
time of severe need by the massive government which Cutting
proposed. The New Deal and Cutting were partners in a sense.
The crucial difference was that Roosevelt experimented his way
into larger efforts 72 while Cutting had always been for big govern- .
ment to meet big challenges.
Finally, President Roosevelt's endorsement of Congressman
Chavez must be explained, especially in the light of FDR's support
for several pro-administration progressives who challenged Democrats. Again, several theories have been advanced. The first is that
the President became angry over Cutting's insistence on increased
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veterans' benefits. Other, more recent, ones include Roosevelt's resentment at an intemperate remark Cutting made about his polio,
and the administration's constant disapproval of third party
politics. 73
There were other avenues, however, vvhich might have led FDR
down the way to Dennis Chavez. The Congressman was not really
a conservative. His voting record indicates substantial support for
the New Deal. Chavez was certainly impressed by Roosevelt's ebullient courage and the enormous presidential power. Furthermore,
Chavez had no real philosophy of government; he was a man who
liked popular projects. Time after time he stressed that he would
back what the people wanted. Beginning in 1933, public opinion
clearly favored the New Deal, and the pragmatic Congressman
was certain to endorse any legislation with direct benefits to his
constituents. In that respect, the President could count on him.
Another aspect of this twisted game undoubtedly plagued Roosevelt. As a candidate in 1932, he had run a successful campaign
by recalling the "Forgotten Man," the American in the middle and
lower classes who had been left behind by the organizational power of industry and who was the real victim of the crunch of depression. FDR forged a coalition with such an appeal that it reversed
many political patterns established since the Civil War. Not only
was Bronson Cutting struggling for the votes of the "Forgotten
New Mexicans," but in many instances his insights were clearer
than the President's. Cutting, indeed, had proved that he could
unify agrarian and urban progressivism in ways that other national
figures could not. Invariably, if they remained in the Republican
Party or went independent, progressives won in the 1930'S only
when they faced extreme or outrageous opponents. 74 Progressives
were independent by nature and usually disorganized. Cutting
proved that he could overcome these drawbacks and make a
much broader appeal than either the Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson brands of progressivism. This controversy was still
raging during the New Deal. Cutting's insistence on a bold, new
government in favor of the farmer, the worker, and dispossessed
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minorities frightened many of these liberals, but in time this became their political standard.
CUTTINc'S POLITICAL FORESIGHT and his personality made him increasingly invincible. He had always reRected confidence and control. He had always been noble yet merciless. Like Roosevelt,
Bronson Cutting appeared courageously tough when facing the
powerful financial interests, but favorable media loved to portray
his tenderness with the helpless-in New Mexico, 'vvith brown
farmers. Yet the public perceived no erratic experimenter in Cutting. Rather they saw a man of consistent vision who had finally·
come into his own.
Richard Hofstadter maintains that "the Progressive mind was
hardly more prepared than the conservative mind for whatcame in
1929."75 Bronson Cutting is the exception. Perhaps the Senator
did not perceive the dangers which his big-government philosophy
harbored because he felt so strongly that it was the only answer to
depression and political instability. Such a combination of personal
traits and rugged insistence on paternalist ideology made Bronson
Cutting a n~tional figure to be reckoned with during these darkest
days. Moreover, the hard-headed national leaders of the Republican
Party saw the advantage of diverting into their own coffers the
wealth of the "chief financial supporter of the nation's progressives."76 Superb politician that he was, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
recognized the danger, even from as unlikely a place as New
Mexico.
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